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THE FIRST AMENDMENT-DETERMINING WHETHER A
TOTAL BAN ON NEWSPAPER RACKS IN A PUBLIC
AIRPORT'S TERMINALS RAISES A GENUINE ISSUE
OF MATERIAL FACT CONCERNING
ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY
LAuRA MCKENERY*
N NEWS & OBSERVER Publishing Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport,
the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision that a
ban on coin-operated newspaper racks in an airport was uncon-
stitutional because it infringed on a newspaper publisher's free-
dom to distribute and freedom of expression.' But this holding
is misguided because there is a genuine issue of material fact
concerning the ban's reasonableness when weighed against the
airport's interests in "security, aesthetics, preserving revenue,
and preventing congestion," and therefore the case should be
remanded for trial.2
In 2002, The News and Observer Publishing Company (the
Observer) contacted the Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority
(the Authority) and requested permission to place newspaper
racks throughout airport terminals.' Newspapers were only
available for purchase from several different shops, which the
Airport required to open sometime before the morning flights
departed and close after the last flights left in the evenings-
usually from 5:30 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.-but there were flights that
arrived after the shops had closed.4 The Authority declined to
set up newsracks due to safety reasons, concern over losing sales
from shops, a lack of floor space,5 and because the airport had
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2012; B.A., St. Edward's
University, 2009. The author gives special thanks to her family for their constant
support and encouragement.
1 597 F.3d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 2010).
2 Id. at 576.
3 Id. at 574.
4 Id. at 574-75.
5 Id. at 575.
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received no complaints from customers about the availability of
newspapers in the airport.
Then, in 2004, the Observer wrote a letter to the Authority
stating that the denial of its request would probably not "survive
First Amendment scrutiny," and again requested permission to
set up the newsracks.6 The Authority denied the request two
more times despite the threat of litigation.7
A few months later, the Observer sued the Authority in fed-
eral district court alleging that denial of its request to set up
newspaper racks was a violation of the First Amendment.8 The
Observer ultimately sought a permanent injunction, which
would allow it to place 208 newsracks in the airport.9 Both the
Authority and the Observer moved for summary judgment,
which the district court ultimately granted to the Observer on its
First Amendment claim.10 The district court stated that the total
ban on coin-operated newsracks "substantially burden [ed] the
newspaper companies' expressive conduct[,]" and in response,
the Authority appealed the district court's grant of summary
judgment.11 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision, holding that there was "insufficient evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the Author-
ity's asserted interests justify the total ban on newsracks inside
the terminals. ' 12 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit stated that
there was no support for the contention that setting up the new-
sracks would frustrate the airport's "purposes of facilitating air
travel and raising revenue."1
The Fourth Circuit held that the ban on newsracks was unrea-
sonable because it "significantly restricted the Publishers' pro-
tected expression" and the Authority did not have legitimate
interests that counterbalanced the restriction.14 The court ex-
amined and addressed the Observer's First Amendment claim
by relying on Multimedia Publishing Co. of South Carolina v. Green-






11 Id. at 575-76 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
12 Id. at 581.
13 Id. (internal citation omitted).
14 Id. at 578, 580.
15 Id. at 576; see generally Multimedia Publ'g Co. of S.C. v. Greenville-Spartan-
burg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1993).
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summary judgment case, it still provided the court with the "sub-
stantive legal framework" to follow when analyzing similar
facts. 6 The court noted that in Multimedia the district court
found that a newsrack ban was unconstitutional, and the judg-
ment was upheld on appeal. 7 In addition, the Fourth Circuit
stated in News & Observer that "the First Amendment pro-
tect[ed] distribution as well as publication" of protected mate-
rial.' In regard to this contention, the Fourth Circuit stated
that the Observer's ability to distribute newspapers was re-
stricted because newspapers were not available on certain morn-
ings and once the stores closed each evening; as a result, the
Observer could not provide newspapers to customers who ar-
rived on the late evening flights.' 9
Because courts consider airports nonpublic fora,2' the state
may "reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communica-
tive or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasona-
ble and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view."' 2' The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that because the ban on newsracks did not discrimi-
nate based on viewpoint, it "need only consider its
reasonableness." 22
Next, the court examined the Authority's assertion of four in-
terests, which could possibly justify the total ban.23 These inter-
ests included "aesthetics, preserving revenue, preventing
congestion, and security. ' 24 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that each of these interests, even though legitimate,
could not counterbalance the "heavy restriction on protected
expression. ' '21 The analysis began with aesthetics. The court
16 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 576; see also Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 156.
17 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 576; see also Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 163.
18 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 576 (quoting Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 158).
19 Id. at 578.
20 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-80
(1992).
21 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
("The State, no less than a private owner of property, has the power to preserve
the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.") (in-
ternal quotations and citations omitted).
22 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 577; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985) (explaining that reasonableness
should be determined "in the light of the purpose of the forum and all the sur-
rounding circumstances"); Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 159.
23 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 578-79.
24 Id. at 578.
25 Id. at 576, 581.
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stated that aesthetic concerns can be severe enough to restrict
protected expression only if the harm is "substantial and widely
recognized," but the Authority did not prove either of these
standards and did not "distinguish newsracks from the vending
machines... [and] ATM machines" already in place.26 Second,
the court considered preserving revenue and rejected the Au-
thority's argument that shops would lose sales if newsracks were
permitted. 27 This concern was not considerable enough to
counterbalance the restriction on protected expression, accord-
ing to the court.28 Third, the court considered the interest of
preventing congestion. The Authority argued that because a
"standard newsrack projects twenty inches" its size "reduces the
pedestrian traffic flow capacity of the corridor by 42 people per
minute. '29 The court also rejected this argument and found
that the airport would only set up a limited number of new-
sracks creating only "trivial congestion."' The Authority did
not distinguish between the congestion the newsracks would
cause compared to the vending machines and ATM machines
already in place. 31 Lastly, the court examined the interest of se-
curity. The Authority argued that newsracks could serve as "hid-
ing places for bombs or weapons. "32 But the court also rejected
this argument because the Authority again failed to distinguish
newsracks from other places in which bombs could be hidden
such as trash cans and vending machines.3 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit held that the "security interest cannot counterbalance
the significant restriction on protected expression."34
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Davis reiterated that the is-
sue on appeal was "whether the court below properly granted
summary judgment to the newspaper publishers" when it held
that the total ban on newsracks infringed on the publisher's
First Amendment rights. 5 Judge Davis concluded that the re-
cord did reflect the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
26 Id. at 579 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 580 (citing Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Berger, 716 F. Supp.
140, 153 (D.N.J. 1989)).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 580-81.
32 Id. at 581.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 582 (Davis, J., dissenting).
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and stated that the district court's grant of summary judgment
should be vacated and remanded for trial.3 6
The dissent also relied on Multimedia and compared the situa-
tion at the Greenville-Spartanburg Airport with the same situa-
tion at the Raleigh-Durham Airport, finding that the "[a] irport's
customers suffer only a minimal burden" due to the ban. 7
Judge Davis noted that customers in the current case had access
to a greater number of shops that stayed open longer than the
stores in the Greenville-Spartanburg Airport." Specifically,
Judge Davis' dissent stressed that the overall burden on passen-
gers was minor since the overwhelming majority of people pass
through the airport when the shops are open and have no diffi-
culty buying newspapers. 9 Moreover, Judge Davis concluded
that the Authority's four asserted interests created "genuine is-
sues of historical as well as ultimate fact regarding the reasona-
bleness of the ban[.]" 4 °
The Fourth Circuit mistakenly answered the wrong question
in concluding that banning newsracks was a violation of the Ob-
server's First Amendment rights. As noted earlier, the question
on appeal from a grant of summary judgment is "whether the
evidentiary record reflects the existence of genuine disputes of
material fact."'" In this case the answer is yes.
Specifically, the Authority was able to establish a "reasonable
fit" between its ends and its means with regard to the newsrack
ban.42 The Greenville-Spartanburg Airport had only one shop
that sold newspapers, whereas the Raleigh-Durham Airport had
eleven." Moreover, the shops in the Raleigh-Durham Airport
noticeably displayed the newspapers in the front of the shops in
contrast to being placed "flat and in the back of the shop" as
36 Id.
37 Id. at 583-84; see also Multimedia Publ'g Co. of S.C. v. Greenville-Spartan-
burg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154, 156-58 (4th Cir. 1993).
38 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 584 (citing Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 159).
39 Id. at 585.
40 Id. at 586.
41 Id. at 582.
42 See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (noting
that a "reasonable fit" is required to justify restriction on protected expression)
(internal citation omitted).
43 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 574; Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 157; see also Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 100 F.3d 175, 185 (1st Cir.
1996) (noting that alternative distribution methods for newspapers were available
that made newsracks unnecessary).
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they were in the Greenville-Spartanburg Airport.44 Further-
more, only 10% of passengers at the Raleigh-Durham Airport
arrive after shops close at 9:00 p.m., and it is unlikely that these
passengers would want to buy a newspaper at that time of day
because "the newspaper that was published earlier that morning
contains outdated news, soon to be replaced by the next day's
newspaper."45 Also, "deplaning passengers account for only
10% of airport purchases."4 6
Moreover, the majority incorrectly weighed each interest indi-
vidually instead of grouping them together as a whole. The
Fourth Circuit should have seen each interest as an "evidentiary
peg.., which is to be weighed with others against the burden
imposed by the ban. '47
With regard to revenue, federal law states that "the airport
owner or operator will maintain a schedule of charges for use of
facilities and services at the airport that will make the airport as
self-sustaining as possible under the circumstances existing at
the airport, including volume of traffic and economy of collec-
tion[.]" 48 In light of this statute, it is clear that the Authority
had a legitimate interest in increasing revenue. Not only does
selling newspapers in shops create "significant income" from the
newspapers themselves, but it generates even more income from
"the impulse buys of newspaper purchasers[.]" 4' Additionally-
although it is true that other things such as ATM machines and
vending machines are already set up throughout the airport-
refraining from adding newsracks improves airport security be-
cause it reduces the number of locations in which terrorists
could hide explosives while also minimizing the tasks of security
officers who check each location. 0 The majority relied on a
conclusion from Multimedia that the security risks that could
arise from the installation of newsracks were minimal, but this
contention is without merit because it was made before the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.5' It is indisputable that the
degree of airport security changed drastically after those attacks,
44 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 584; Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 160.
45 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 585.
46 Id. (internal citations omitted).
47 Id. at 590.
48 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a) (13) (A) (2006).
49 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 587.
5o See Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Berger, 716 F. Supp. 140, 153-54
(D.NJ. 1989) (concluding that removing newsracks would improve security).
51 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 589; see also Multimedia Publ'g Co. of S.C. v.
Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154, 162 (4th Cir. 1993).
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which undercuts the validity of an airport-security argument as-
serted eight years before.
Further, the majority's conclusion concerning the interest of
preventing congestion also misses the mark. Preventing conges-
tion is a valid concern, and each newsrack "reduces pedestrian
traffic flow capacity by I 10 people per minute, without allowing
for any baggage placed on the floor while the device is in use. 52
During busy travel times "maximum flow of pedestrian traffic is
essential."53 Lastly, even the interest of aesthetics is legitimate.
The ban would act "as an appropriate means of maintaining the
airport's physical appearance" because newsracks are not "essen-
tial to the efficient operation of the terminal facilities."54
In addition, since the Supreme Court decision in Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York, fed-
eral courts have applied the following four-part test to
determine whether restricting commercial speech is constitu-
tional under the First Amendment: (1) whether the First
Amendment protects the expression; (2) whether the speech is
lawful and not misleading; (3) whether the government interest
is substantial; and (4) whether the "regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. '55 In this case,
even if the Observer had alleged a violation of the commercial
speech doctrine-and the restricted speech was not unlawful or
misleading-the Authority's four interests in aesthetics, security,
increasing revenue, and preventing congestion would still out-
weigh the restriction on protected expression because these in-
terests considered as a whole directly advance the Authority's
two main purposes-"facilitating air travel and raising
revenue."56
In conclusion, it is clear that the total ban on newsracks was
reasonable because the Authority asserted legitimate interests
concerning aesthetics, security, increasing revenue, and prevent-
ing congestion. Additionally, the burden imposed on the Ob-
server was minimal because it could easily distribute newspapers
in a multitude of different shops to the majority of travelers.
The burden imposed on passengers was also minimal. The
52 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 589.
53 Gannett, 716 F. Supp. at 153.
54 Id. at 152-53 n.16.
55 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
56 News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 581 (majority opinion).
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handful of passengers who could not buy a newspaper after 9:00
p.m. is not sufficient to deem the ban unconstitutional. The
majority incorrectly affirmed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Observer and did not address the
correct question on appeal. In this case, there are genuine is-
sues of material fact that the trial court should resolve upon
remand.
